William R. Rothstein, an individual v. Snowbird Corporation, a Utah corporation : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
William R. Rothstein, an individual v. Snowbird
Corporation, a Utah corporation : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jesse Trentadue, Esq.; Suitter Axland; Attorneys for Appellant.
Gordon Strachan, Esq.; Kevin J. Simon, Esq.; Strachan and Strachan; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Rothstein v. Snowbird Corporation, No. 20060158 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6302
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WILLIAM ROTHSTEIN, an individual, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
v. 
SNOWBIRD CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Appeal No. 20060158 - SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE SNOWBERD CORPORATION 
APPEAL FROM THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ANTHONY QUINN 
Jesse Trentadue, Esq. (4961) 
SUITTERAXLAND 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
William Rothstein 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. (3133) 
Kevin J. Simon, Esq. (8100) 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN, P.C. 
401 Main Street, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 1800 
Park City, Utah 84060-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Snowbird Corporation 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 1 7 2006 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WILLIAM ROTHSTEIN, an individual, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
SNOWBIRD CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Appeal No. 20060158-SC 
BRD2F OF APPELLEE SNOWBffiD CORPORATION 
APPEAL FROM THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE ANTHONY QUINN 
Jesse Trentadue, Esq. (4961) 
SUITTERAXLAND 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
William Rothstein 
Gordon Strachan, Esq. (3133) 
Kevin J. Simon, Esq. (8100) 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN, P.C. 
401 Main Street, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 1800 
Park City, Utah 84060-1800 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
Snowbird Corporation 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the 
Court Below 2 
Statement of the Facts 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 4 
ARGUMENT 5 
I. THE SNOWBIRD RELEASE AGREEMENTS ROTHSTEIN 
VOLUNTARILY SIGNED ARE CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL AND 
ENFORCEABLE 5 
A. Utah Only Requires That Exculpatory Agreements Clearly and 
Unequivocally Express a General Intent to Release Claims 
of Negligence 5 
B. Although Not Essential to Enforcement of the Release Agreements, 
Rothstein^4/.r0 Expressly Assumed All Risk of Injury 7 
II. WHETHER APPLYING TUNKL OR ANY OTHER "PUBLIC POLICY" TEST, 
THE GREAT MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS ENFORCE EXCULPATORY 
AGREEMENTS INVOLVING RECREATIONAL PROVIDERS 9 
III. ROTHSTEIN'S APPLICATION OF THE CALIFORNIA TUNKL TEST IS 
STRAINED AND EVEN CONTRADICTS THE BERLANGIERI MINORITY 
DECISION UPON WHICH HE RELIES 14 
IV. THE FOUR "PUBLIC POLICY" CASES RELIED UPON BY ROTHSTEIN 
ARE MINORITY HOLDINGS THAT ARE CLEARLY DISTINGUISHABLE 
IN ANY EVENT 17 
A. Dalury v. S-K-ILtd. and Hanks v. PowderRidge 17 
i 
B. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corporation and Phillips v. Monarch are Likewise 
Distinguishable and of No Consequence 20 
V. FOLLOWING ROTHSTEIN'S PUBLIC POLICY CASES WOULD INVADE 
THE UTAH LEGISLATURE'S PROVINCE BY IGNORING WHAT THE 
LEGISLATURE DOES WHEN IT INTENDS ON PROHIBITING 
EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS 23 
VI. ROTHSTEIN'S OUT-OF-CONTEXT CITATION TO LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY DOES NOTHING TO INVALIDATE THE RELEASES HE 
SIGNED VOLUNTARILY AS AN ADULT 27 
A. Nothing in the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act Suggests that Utah's Legislature 
Intended to Invalidate Exculpatory Agreements and, Thus, Under Utah Law, 
It Is Improper to Consider Legislative History 27 
B. Even If Legislative History is Considered, Ski Area Exculpatory Agreements 
Do Not Violate the Inherent Risk Act's Public Policy 28 
CONCLUSION 31 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Allan v. Snow Summit, 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813 (Cal. App. 4th Dist 1996) 13 
Archer v. Board of State Lands, 907 P.2d 1142 (Utah 1995) 1 
Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp.472 (D. Colo. 1992) 12,15-16 
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corporation, 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003) 14,20-22 
Berube v. Fashion Centre, 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989) 23 
Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters, Inc., 100 P.3d 465 (Colo. 2004) 22,29 
ChauvHer v. Booth Creek Holdings, Inc., 35 P.3d. 383 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). 11-12,15,17,24 
Clanton v. United Skates of America, 686 N.E.2d 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997) 18,29 
Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 181,184-85 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 1987) 
8,11 
Dalury v. S-K-ILtd., 670 A.2d 795 (Vt.1997) 17 
Donegan v. Beech Bend Raceway Park, Inc., 894 F.2d 205 (W.D. Ky. 1990) 18 
Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 362, 371-72 (Utah 1990) 6 
Finch v. Andrews, 863 P.2d 496 (Ore. Ct. App.1993) 23 
Hanks v. Powder Ridge, 888 A.2d734,747 (Conn. 2005) 19-20 
Harmon v. Mt. Hood Meadows, 932 P.2d 92 (Ore. Ct. App. 1997) 13 
Hawkins v. Peart, 37 P.3d 1062 (Utah 2001) 9 
Heil Valley Ranch, Inc. v. Simkin, 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989) 6 
Henderson v. Quest Expeditions, 174 S.W.3d 730 (Tenn. Ct. App.2005) 10,29 
Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute, 214 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1985) 10-11 
Jacobsen Construction Co0 Inc. et al. v. Structo-Lite Engineerings I n c ^ . . . *_. . ^ ^ . . ^. 7-8 
Lahey v. Twin Lakes Expeditions, 964 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Colo. 1996) 6 
Lloyd v. Sugarloaf Mountain, et al., 833 A.2d 1 (Me. 2003) 12 
Marc Street v. Darwin Ranch, 75 F. Supp.2d 1296 (D. Wyo. 1999) 6,13,17,29 
Mazza v. Ski Shawnee, 74 Pa. D. &C. 4th 416 (Pa. Comm. Pleas Ct. 2005) 13 
McCune v. Myrtle Beach Indoor Shooting Range, 612 S.E. 2d 462 (So. Car. App. 2005). 13,18 
Milligan v. Big Valley Corp., 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1998) 6,12 
Mincin v. Vail Holdings, Inc., 308 F.3d 1105 (10th Cir. 2002) 16 
Moon Lake Elec. Assn. v. Ultrasystems Wstrn Const, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah 1988) . . . 20 
i i i 
Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 306 (1930) 23 
Phillips v. Monarch, 668 P.2d 982 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) 20,21 
Plant v. Wilbur, 47 S.W.3d 889 (Ark. 2001) 13 
Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area, 128 Cal. Rptr.885 (Cal. App. 3rd Dist. 2002) 11 
Potter v. Nat'l Handicapped Sports, 849 F. Supp. 1407 (D. Colo. 1994) 12 
Reed v. University of North Dakota, 589 N.W.2d 880 (N.D. 1999) 13 
Retherford v. AT&T, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) 23,28 
Russ v. Woodside Homes, Inc., 905 P.2d 901 (Utah App. 1995) 5-6 
Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev., Inc., 569 F.2d 1117 (10th Cir. 1978) 16 
Seigneur v. Nat'l Fitness Institute, Inc., 752 A.2d 631 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 2000).. 10,17,23-24 
Smith, et al. v. Price Development Company, 125 P.3d 945, 949-50 (Utah 2005) 27 
Sorenson's Ranch v. Dept of Human Services, et al.,36 P3d 528' (Utah 2001) 26 
Tunkl v. Regents of the University of California, 383 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1963) 9-10,14-15 
Walton v. Oz Bicycle Club of Wichita, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17655 (D. Kan.1991).. 13,18 
Webb v. Jiminy Peak, 2002 Mass. App. Div. 16 (Mass. App. 2002) 13 
Zollman v. High Country Snowmobile Tours, 797 F. Supp. 923 (D. Utah 1992) 25-26 
STATUTES 
C.R.S. § 33-44-104 21 
U.C.A. § 13-8-1 24 
U.C.A. § 34-34-4 24 
U.C.A. § 41-22-1 to -33 25 
U.C.A. § 57-14-1 to -7 26 
U.C.A. § 62A- 4a- 401 26 
U.C.A. § 78-2-2(3)© 1 
U.C.A. § 78-15-7 24 
U.C.A. § 78-18-1(3) 27 
U.C.A § 78-27-51 17,28 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 496D, com. a 8 
iv 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
As described further in Snowbird's^/Sbf Motion for Summary Disposition, Snowbird 
disputes that appellate jurisdiction exists here because Rothstein voluntarily dismissed his 
gross negligence claim without prejudice. Snowbird does not, however, object to Rothstein's 
alternative position that his gross negligence claim be dismissed mth prejudice if no 
jurisdiction otherwise exists. If Rotiistein's ^raw negligence claim is dismissed mth prejudice, 
the Utah Supreme Court will then have jurisdiction over Rothstein's appeal pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §78-2-2(3)0. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
This appeal challenges Third Judicial District Court Judge Anthony Quinn's ("Judge 
Quinn") decision granting Snowbird's Summary Judgment Motion and dismissing 
Rothstein's ordinary negligence claim with prejudice. 
1. Did the trial court correcdy grant Snowbird summary judgment, dismissing 
Rothstein's ordinary negligence claim based on either of the two Release Agreements 
Rothstein voluntarily signed as an adult ? (R. at 174-194, 324-376, 417-418). 
In reviewing summary judgment, the trial court's conclusions of law, finding no 
genuine issues of disputed material fact are reviewed de novo for correctness. See Archer v. 
Board of State Lands & Forestry. 907 P.2d 1142,1144-45 (Utah 1995). 
STATEMENT OF T H E CASE 
I. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition in the 
Court Below. 
This is a personal injury case involving a 50 year old long-time recreational skier 
(Rothstein) who injured himself at Snowbird Ski Resort in Little Cottonwood Canyon, Utah. 
(R. at 1-9, 344). On December 7, 2004, Rothstein filed a Complaint against Snowbird 
alleging claims for ordinary negligence. (R. at 1-9). On August 26, 2005, Snowbird filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, requesting Judge Quinn to dismiss with prejudice Rothstein's 
ordinary negligence claims. (R. at 174-194, 324-376). On January 23, 2006, Judge Quinn 
signed an Order granting Snowbird's Summary Judgment Motion and dismissing with 
prejudice Rothstein's ordinary negligence claims. (R. at 417-418). Judge Quinn, as part of the 
same Order, denied Rothstein's Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment re: Snowbird's 
Eighth Affirmative Defense (i.e. Release Agreement defense) and Rothstein's Rule 56(f) 
Request (or "Motion") for Continuance. (R. at 417-418). Rothstein did not appeal Judge 
Quinn's denial of the Rule 56(f) Request. 
Judge Quinn also granted, by separate Order, Rothstein's Motion to Amend to add a 
gross negligence claim. (R. at 415-416). Rothstein amended his Complaint, eliminating his 
ordinary negligence claim, and replacing it with a gross negligence claim. (R. at 419-425). 
Rothstein also contemporaneously filed a Notice of Voluntary Dismissal without Prejudice 
concerning his gross negligence claim and then appealed. (R. at 426-427). 
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•.ccitement of the Facts 
On February "\ 70(K, Rntfishin inpirnl himself skiing M Snowbird 11isl IK I. x A \ ,ii 
track and a permanent orange flagged rope-line used for warning and skier awareness 
purposes. .< .r. - ... ;ii • X.ni.suni I-- mti\d wnh mini ,iini.ei • ribbings (referred to hv 
Rothsteinas tcrailro;i*hir^'* i-.- ; * i •, ! -v.,•-• i 
above 'T\ at 2 - \ ST90V To access these mine timber cribbings, Rothstein skied off'the cat 
tc-n. •: . . : • . . • a uv .w.> ibe cat track and the permanent rope ]UK\ . ,* i " 
Other than Rothstein's 2003 incident, no other injuries -!i i ^ - ; • .* • • • 1 
connection with the mine timber cribbings. (R at 84-36). The mine timber cribbings -md 
, ;M,LT cm i-' >|-,. :<k immediately nbo\c :; -.i.ive existed .>incc the Summer of i*' :1 at 
84-86). 
On November 20, 2002, approximately 2 Vz months prior to Rothstein's incident, 
•' . • . . .i.tiii-. <i\ijr u . o _;*.i:.;.i '-^u . -. • : : jjiii.v Agreements fi . ..-«* J i)J „IHJ3 
ski season. (R. at 185, 189-191), Ex. "A" to Addendum. As pan oi *hi-<c \h]< IM-
Agreements, Rothstein expressly agreed to assume all risks of injury and released Snowbird 
from liabi 1 it y for its o wii iiegl igence (R it 185, 191), Ex. ' i \ ' 1 o : Addendum Rothstein asked 
no questions concerning the Releases and no verbal representations were made to him. \±v. 
at 177, I HO 190, 21 >9). i )nc Release was signed in exchange for an Alta-Snowbird 2002-2003 
Seasons Pass and 'the other K elease was signed for a Sev en Si :i mm its Club membersh ip (E 
at 185, 191). The Seven Summits membership entided him to cut in front of other skiers in 
the aerial I ram line for faster access to the ski slopes. (Appellant's i>rici .u . :Vi 1). 
Rothstein did not have to ski and, in any event, could have skied without signing a 
Release Agreement. (R. at 351, 356-362). Among other options, Rothstein could have skied 
at Snowbird on a day pass or could have purchased a 2002-2003 Seasons Pass for Park City 
Mountain Resort without ever signing a Release. (R. at 351, 356-362).* 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rothstein voluntarily signed two Release Agreements for the 2002-2003 ski season 
that expressly released Snowbird from liability for injuries resulting from Snowbird's 
negligence. (R. at 185,189-191). Rothstein signed these Releases 2 V2 months prior to 
injuring himself on February 3, 2003, and, thus, had ample time to contemplate whether to 
sign the Releases or not. (R. at 185,189-191). 
Unlike hospital care, public transportation or utilities, recreational skiing does not 
implicate matters of "great public importance" or "practical necessity" and is not an 
"essential service". Indeed, the great majority of jurisdictions enforce pre-injury exculpatory 
agreements in the recreational activities context. Additionally, Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing 
Act does not evidence a legislative intent to prohibit exculpatory agreements. When Utah's 
legislature seeks to bar exculpatory or other agreements, it states so expressly. Utah's 
legislature chose not to do so in Utah's Inherent Risk Act. Instead, Utah's legislature focused 
1
 In everything Rothstein files with this Court, including his Appellant's Brief, he 
recounts his purported injuries. The nature of Rothstein's injuries are irrelevant here because 
the Release Agreements clearly and unequivocally released Snowbird from liability for its 
own negligence. In addition, Rothstein also expressly assumed all risks of injury, including 
injuries caused by Snowbird's purported negligence. Regardless, this Court should be aware 
that Rothstein undisputedly returned to the slopes and skied 36 days the following season at 
Snowbird alone - a fact that Rothstein does not disclose. (R. at 193-194). 
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on protecting Utah's ski resorts from sharply rising insurance premiums and minimal 
insu ranee coverage options a pi ibl ic: poJ icy consistent with enforcing excu Lpatorj 
agreements. Thus, Judge Quinn's decision granting Snowbird's Summary Judgment and 
dismissing with prejudice Rothstein's ordinary negligence claims should be affirmed. 
AlUillMUNT 
T H E SNOWBIRD RELEASE AGREEMENTS ROTHSTEIN 
VOLUNTARILY SIGNED ARE CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL AND 
ENFORCEABLE. 
Rot hstein • :» \ erstates [ Jtah's legal reqi li rement concern ing exci llpatorj • agreen lent 
language relating to release of claims and assumption of risks. In doing so, Rothstein ignores 
Utah case law cliiv v. ,* .K (dressing these issues. 
A. Utah Only Requires That iixculpatory Agreements Clearly and 
Unequivocally Express a General Intent to Release Claims of 
Negligence 
.•:>, v\, -.ipatory agreements need not enumerate or forecast the precise 
mechanism of injury io be enforceable. Instead, I Jfjili \\\)\\ n kt |i ii re • '^ , us «lo . M ^  *• 
an exculpatory agreement clearly and unequivocally express an intent to release claims of 
negligence. 
In Russ v. Woodside Homes. Inc.. 905 P.2d 901, 903-904 - (Utah \ r - 1<)0^ the • 
, J • t in i >t Appeals enforced a hold harmless agreement against the heirs of a women 
wi u > j CJ i i i ii < * a, i w >ic in h e r d r iveway du ring constn iction I he ^ greement in no w ay referred 
to "the. specific mechanism, of injury (i.e. falling into a hole in die driveway) and, in fact, did 
not even refer to waiving claims of negligence. Id. Yet, the Utah Court of Appeals found" •  ••'• 
5 
the Agreement to be "clear and unequivocal" in any event. Id. at 906. Indeed, as the Utah 
Supreme Court held in Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co.. 793 P.2d 362, 371-72 (Utah 
1990) {opinion by Justice Howe), "[a] hold harmless provision is enforceable when "the broad 
sweep of the language employed by the parties clearly covers those instances in which [a 
party] may be negligent... language releasing an indemnitee from 'any claims for damages 
to property and injury or death' constituted a sufficiently clear and unequivocal expression 
to release for alleged negligence", (emphasis added). See also, e.g., Milligan v. Big Valley 
Corp. d /b/a Grand Targhee Ski Resort 754 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988) ("It is difficult to 
envision any other intent of the parties than to release [the resort] from liability for 
negligence . . .[if] this were not the intent, there would be little purpose in the release at all" -
skier's claims dismissed based on pre-injury Release); Street v. Darwin Ranch, 75 F. Supp.2d 
1296,1302 (D. Wyo. 1999) (rejecting plaintiffs argument that because the "specific hazard 
was not identified" the Release was invalid - pre-injury Release enforced in horseback trail 
outfitter case); Lahey v. Covington. 964 F. Supp. 1440 (D. Colo. 1996) quotingfrom Heil 
Valley Ranch. Inc. v. Simkin. 784 P.2d 781, 785 (Colo. 1989) ("Colorado law does not 
require that an exculpatory agreement describe in detail each specific risk that the signor 
may encounter" - white-water rafting injury claims dismissed based on pre-injury Release), 
(emphasis added). 
Here, the two Snowbird Release Agreements clearly and unequivocally release claims 
of negligence. (R. at 185, 191). Indeed, clearer than the release language enforced in Russ 
and Freund above, the Snowbird Releases conspicuously contain the word "negligence", 
6 
expressly releasing such claims. , See Alta-Snowbird Release Agreement, Ex. 'A' to Addendum 
(''I agree to hold harmless and *! ••'*• - -i ;u tragi--** i • ^ioyees 
from all of my claims, including those caused by the negligence or other fault of Alta or 
Snowbird, their agents and employees") (emphasis in original) and Seven Summits Club 
Release, Ex. A5 to Addendum ("I release and agree lo indemnify Snowbird from all 
i liiims for injun <- (la^i.yr .snsinsr oui of .In operation of the ski area or my 
m (i'n mil's at bno\ M-f, ^v.iciiu . . . . . »*,,«. v w> damage arises from the risks of skiing 
o f from a n y othei I^UM- including uie n ^ u ^ u e e j i i j^.ou bird, its employ ees and 
agents"), (emphasis in original', \ecordingh, Snowbird^ Release Agreements actually 
r\«e< * • >\\i -;L.'ijinenis ana are, .;. . Jvai * .a ,IUAJUI\'K af''. 
B. Although Not Essential to Enforcement of the Release \uri $, 
Rothstein A Iso Expressly Assumed All Risk of Injury. 
Rothstein also mistakenly asserts that in order to assume a risk contractually, it must 
be a voluntary nssnmplinn <»l j lutu,\n speiiiii risL in iliis i ;H(, n nic limbo uiblung just 
below a flagged, permanent rope-line, necessary to structural ly support a cat track. In doing 
11», Hi iilhsfein contuses express contractual assumption of risk with the primary and/or secondary 
assumption of risk doctrines. 
In Tacobsen Construction Co.. Inc. et al. v. Structo-Lite Engineering. Inc., 61M P.Jd 
MH\ Vl'i -in i'f 'ijli l ;''h MM Uuli Supienu1 ( niift made cleat thai llic express :orrn o 
assumption of risk is very different from all other forms. This Comt stated in perlini nf |»- • t f: 
For purposes of this analysis, assumption of risk is often divided into three 
categories. Those courts which attempt to deal with the various cone c; • (s 
subsumed under the one label refrain from considering one form, that is, the 
'express' form of assumption of risk, \n express assumption '^"ri^k ir- olves t 
contractual provision in which a party expressly contracts not to sue for injury 
or loss which may thereafter be occasioned by the acts of another. We not 
only follow suit by refraining to include this form of assumption of risk in our 
discussion, but furthermore fail to see a necessity for including this form 
within assumption of risk terminology. As stated in James, Assumption of Risk, 
61 YaleJLJ. 141 (1952), the field of contract law is more than adequate to 
deal with this bar to recovery. We are thus left with the primary and 
secondary forms of assumption of risk. 
Id. (Emphasis added). 
Given the fact Utah "contract law" allows for the broad release of claims in 
exculpatory agreements without referring to the exact mechanism of injury, there is no 
reason why express contractual assumption of risk provisions need any more specificity. See 
also Coates v. Newhall Land & Farming, Inc., 236 Cal. Rptr. 181,184-85 (Cal. App. 2nd Dist. 
1987) ("[KJnowledge of a particular risk is unnecessary where there is an express 
agreement to assume all risk; by express agreement a 'plaintiff may undertake to 
assume all of the risks of a particular . . . situation, whether they are known or 
unknown to him.9 (Rest. 2d Torts, § 496D, com. a, italics added; Prosser & Keaton, Torts, 
supra, § 68, p. 482.) . . . even if [plaintiff] was visiting the [dirt bike] park for the first time, as 
appellants allege, 'neither knowledge of the danger involved, nor appreciation of the 
magnitude of the risk, requires the clairvoyance to foresee the exact accident and 
injury which in fact occurred'). (Bold emphasis added). (Italics in original). 
Here, Rothstein voluntarily signed two separate Release Agreements for the 2002-
2003 season, expressly assuming all risks. (R. at 185,191). See Alta-Snowbird Release 
Agreement, Ex. CA' to Addendum ("I agree to assume all risks of personal injury, death 
or property damage associated with skiing . . . or resulting from the fault of Alta or 
8 
Snowbird") (emphasis in original) and Seven Summits Club Release Agreement, Ex. A.' to 
Addendum ("I agree to assume and accept all risks of injury to myself, including the 
inherent risks of skiing, the risks associated with the operation of the ski area and 
risks caused by the negligence of Snowbird") (emphasis in original). Accordingly, 
Rothstein cannot circumvent his contractual commitments by asserting that Snowbird did 
not specifically disclose in advance that he could be injured by skiing into mine timber 
cribbings or similar structures. 
II. WHETHER APPLYING TUNKL OR ANY OTHER "PUBLIC 
POLICY" TEST, THE GREAT MAJORITY OF JURISDICTIONS 
ENFORCE EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS INVOLVING 
RECREATIONAL PROVIDERS. 
Rothstein erroneously asserts that the two Release Agreements he signed voluntarily 
are unenforceable based on a six part public policy test established in Tunkl v. Regents of the 
University of California. 383 P.2d 441 (Calif. 1963). This six part test, not adopted in Utah2, 
examines whether a Release Agreement exhibits the following characteristics: 
[1] It concerns a business of a type generally thought suitable for public 
regulation. [2] The party seeking exculpation is engaged in performing a 
2
 In Hawkins v. Peart d /b /a Navajo Trails. 37 P.3d 1062, 1065 (Utah 2001) {opinion 
by Justice Durrant)^ the Utah Supreme Court noted that it has not yet adopted any specific 
standard for determining the validity of a pre-injury exculpatory agreement. This Court 
instead relied on extensive public policy related exclusively to minor children in evaluating a pre-
injury Release Agreement intended to waive liability for injuries sustained by a minor child 
on a horseback trail excursion. This Court stated: "Tunkl and Jones [v. Dressel, 623 P.2d 
370, 376 (Colo. 1981)] set forth standards for determining whether the public interest in the 
activity at issue warrants an exception to the general rule allowing releases. However, we 
need not reach the question of whether to adopt the Tunkl or Jones standard, or any 
other standard generally relating to the public interest exception, because, in 
deciding the case before us, we rely on the public policy exception specifically 
relating to releases of a minor's claims". Id. at 1065. (emphasis added). 
9 
service of great importance to the public, which is often a matter of practical 
necessity for some members of the public. [3] The party holds [itself] out as 
willing to perform this service for any member of the public who seeks it, or at 
least for any member coming within certain established standards. [4] As a 
result of the essential nature of the service, in the economic setting of the 
transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive advantage of 
bargaining strength against any member of the public who seeks [its] services. 
[5] In exercising a superior bargaining power the party confronts the public 
with a standardized adhesion contract of exculpation, and makes no provision 
whereby a purchaser may pay additional reasonable fees and obtain protection 
against negligence. [6] Finally, as a result of the transaction, the person or 
property of the purchaser is placed under the control of the seller, subject to 
the risk of carelessness by the seller or [its] agents. Id. at 445-46. 
What Rothstein fails to recognize, however, is that the great majority of jurisdictions 
(whether applying Tunkl or not) enforce pre-injury exculpatory agreements in the 
recreational sports context.3 See Seigneur v. National Fitness Institute. Inc.. 752 A.2d 631, 
641 (Md. Spec. Ct. App. 2000) ("[C]ourts from other jurisdictions almost universally have 
held that contracts relating to recreational activities do not fall within any of the categories 
that implicate public interest concerns"), (emphasis added); Henderson v. Quest 
Expeditions. 174 S.W.3d 730, 734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005) ("The majority view from sister 
states is that an exculpatory provision which specifically and expressly releases a defendant 
from its own negligence will be upheld, without regard to whether the injury sustained 
is one typically thought to be 'inherent in the sport'" - white-water rafting pre-injury 
Release enforced) (emphasis added). 
3
 In Tunkl. the exculpatory agreement at issue sought to release a hospital from 
liability for negligent hospital care services rendered and had nothing at all to do with 
recreational sporting activities. Tunkl. 383 P.2d at 441. The great majority of jurisdictions 
have drawn a strong and clear distinction between essential services such as hospital care, 
public transportation and utilities and purely voluntary, non-essential recreational activities 
such as skiing. See e.g. Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center. 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 342 (Cal. 
App. 4th Dist 1985) at p . l l herein. 
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Indeed, even in California (where the Tunkl standard originated), courts consistently 
have refused to invalidate pre-injury exculpatory agreements in the recreational sports 
context. See Platzer v. Mammoth Mountain Ski Area. 128 Cal. Rptr. 885, 888-889 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 3rd Dst. 2002) ("[CJourts routinely exclude recreational sports from the purview of 
Tunkl, concluding that such activities are not of great public importance or practical 
necessity" - ordinary negligence claims dismissed on "summary adjudication" based on 
Release Agreement where individual fell from a chairlift during a ski lesson), (emphasis 
added); Hulsey v. Elsinore Parachute Center. 168 Cal. App. 3d 333, 342 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 
1985) ("When referring to "essential services" the court in Tunkl clearly had in mind 
medical, legal, housing, transportation or similar services which must necessatilyhz 
utilized by the general public. Purely recreational activities such as sport 
parachuting can hardly be considered "essential". In sum, measuring the 
transaction here against the Tunkl factors, we can see no logical reason for extending 
the "public interest" limitation on the freedom of contract to the exculpatory 
agreement here relied on by defendant"). (Italics in original). (Bold emphasis added); and 
Coates v. NewhalL 236 Cal. Rptr. 181,185 (Cal. App. 2nd Dst. 1987) ("c[B]y no means 
other than a most strained construction could the exculpatory instrument in issue 
involve the public interest"' - pre-injury Release enforced, dismissing wrongful death dirt 
bike accident case), (emphasis added). 
Most jurisdictions, in fact, enforce exculpatory agreements after simply determining 
that the subject activity is not a "matter of great public importance", "practical necessity", or 
an "essential service". In Chauvlier v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings, Inc., 35 P.3d 383, 388 
(Wash. Ct. App. 2001), the Court enforced a pre-injury exculpatory agreement against a 
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recreational skier who, similar to Rothstein's allegations, was injured when he skied into 
"man-made structures" purportedly not visible from above. The Chauvlier Court stated: 
C[A] survey of cases assessing exculpatory clauses reveals that the common 
determinative factor for Washington courts has been the services5 or 
activities5 importance to the public . . . Despite its recreational appeal, 
skiing is not a 'service of great importance to the public,' much less a 
service of 'practical necessity.5 Rather, skiing is a private and 
nonessential activity [and] cannot be said to be Vital for the benefit of 
mankind5. 
Id. at 388-89. (Emphasis added). See also, e.g., Milligan v. Big Valley Corporation, et aL 754 
P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1988) (Wyoming Supreme Court unanimously enforced a pre-injury Release 
against a recreational skier who died in a race-related crash at Grand Targhee Ski Resort 
because (1) the race could "hardly be deemed of great importance to the public or essential 
to individual members of the public" and (2) Grand Targhee held no "decisive bargaining 
advantage" because the decedent could have chosen not to ski); Potter v. Nat'l Handicapped 
Sports. 849 F. Supp. 1407,1409-10 (D. Colo. 1994) ("By definition and common sense, the 
[National Handicapped Ski Championships] is neither a matter of great public importance 
nor a matter of practical necessity" - pre-injury Release enforced); Bauer v. Aspen Highlands 
Skiing Corp.. 788 F. Supp. 472, 474-75 (D. Colo. 1992) ("defendant's recreational services 
were not essential and, therefore, they did not enjoy an unfair bargaining advantage . . . 
Plaintiff could have satisfied her business interest by absorbing the ambiance of Aspen 
without skiing" - pre-injury release enforced). Lloyd v. Sugarloaf Mountain, et aL 833 A.2d 
1, 9-10 (Me. 2003) (Pre-injury Release enforced - "hard-pressed" to conclude that the 
Widowmaker Challenge event was a "public service or that its entrants were under any 
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compulsion to sign the release"); Allan v. Snow Summit Inc.. 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 813, 824-25 
(Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1996) (Pre-injury Release enforced - recreational activities like skiing are 
voluntary non-essential services that do not affect the "public interest").4 
Here, Rothstein's voluntary decision to ski at Snowbird does not implicate matters of 
great public importance or practical necessity anymore so than the other recreational 
participants above whose claims were dismissed based on pre-injury Releases. Rothstein did 
not have to ski at Snowbird or anywhere else for that matter and certainly did not have to 
participate in the Seven Summits Pass program that entitled him to cut in front of other 
4
 The following are examples of additional jurisdictions that also enforce pre-injury 
releases - some, even where no Tunkl elements are analyzed. See e.g. Harmon v. Mt. Hood 
Meadows. Ltd., 932 P.2d 92, 97 (Ore. Ct. App. 1997) (Ski resort's Seasons Pass Release not 
against public policy (no Tunkl analysis) - chairlift loading injury claims dismissed); Webb v. 
Jiminy Peak 2002 Mass. App. Div. 16,18 (Mass. App. 2002) ("[W]e have repeatedly recognized 
that, at least in the case of ordinary negligence, the "allocation [of] risk by agreement is not 
contrary to public policy" (no Tunkl analysis) - release agreement enforced in favor of ski resort 
despite ski resort providing plaintiffs with improper boots and/or bindings); Reed v. University 
of North Dakota. etal.. 589 N.W.2d 880, 887 (N.D. 1999) (Pre-injury Release enforced against 
collegiate hockey player injured in pre-season "road race" because the race did not constitute 
an "essential" or "public" service and "[plaintiff] was not under economic or other compulsion 
from [defendant] to sign the release"); Plant v. Wilbur, et al.. 47 S.W.2d 889, 894 (Ark. 2001) 
(Auto racing is not the "type of enterprise . . . people have to rely upon like public 
transportation or other types of enterprises where people of necessity have to go just to get 
through life and conduct regular business activities, making a living"); Marc Street v. Darwin 
Ranch. Inc.. 75 F. Supp.2d 1296,1299 (D. Wyo. 1999) ('Without denigrating the eminent role 
of equine pursuits in the history, culture and economy of Wyoming, the Court concludes that 
Defendant's [horseback trail guide] services plainly are not of sufficient public import to 
engender a public duty"); McCune v. Myrtle Beach Indoor Shooting Range, et al.. 612 S.E. 2d 
462, 466 (So. Car. Ct. App. 2005) (Pre-injury Release enforced because "participation in a 
paintball match is voluntary"); Mazza v. Ski Shawnee. Inc.. 74 Pa. D. & C. 4th 416, 421-22 (Pa. 
Comm. Pleas Ct. 2005) (pre-injury Release enforced because snow tubing at ski resort 
involved private parties' affairs and constituted a "purely recreational" activity); and Walton 
v. Oz Bicycle Club of Wichita. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17655, *10-11 (D. Kan. 1991) (Bicycle 
race pre-injury release enforceable - "[e]ven the fact that a participant considers the sport to be 
more than a 'hobby' and hopes to someday participate at an Olympic level, will not raise the 
matter to a compelling public interest"). 
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Snowbird patrons waiting to board the aerial Tram. (R. at 351, 356-362). (See also 
Appellant's Brief at 1, fn.l). Thus, consistent with the great majority of jurisdictions, the 
Releases voluntarily signed by Rothstein should be enforced. 
III. ROTHSTEIN'S APPLICATION OF T H E CALIFORNIA TUNKL TEST IS 
STRAINED AND EVEN CONTRADICTS THE BERLANGIERI 
MINORITY DECISION UPON WHICH HE RELIES. 
Rothstein's application of the Tunkl standard is so strained it even contradicts 
Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corp., 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003), the primary minority decision 
cited by Rothstein in his trial court Opposition Memorandum. (R. at 216-217). Specifically, 
Rothstein overreaches by claiming the "first three elements of the Tunkl'test" are met simply 
because Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act acknowledges skiing's popularity and that the 
sport significantly contributes to Utah's economy. The first three Tunkl elements are: 
(1) whether the Agreement concerns a business "generally thought suitable for 
public regulation", (2) whether the party seeking exculpation is engaged in 
performing a service of great public importance, which is often a matter of 
practical necessity, and (3) whether the party holds itself out as willing to 
perform this service for any member of the public coming within certain 
established standards. Tunkl. 383 P.2d at 445. 
In Berlangieri the New Mexico Supreme Court found that (1) statutory language concerning 
the "equine industry" only satisfied the first Tunkl element (not the first three elements as 
Rothstein asserts here) and (2) the second Tunkl element actually weighed in favor of 
enforcing the Release.5 Berlangieri. 76 P.3d at 1113. 
5 
Even with respect to the first Tunkl element, because most businesses are 
"suitable for public regulation" through statutory enactment, this element is arguably 
the least compelling of the Tunkl test. Legal tests are designed to limit or focus certain 
inquiries from an infinite pool (i.e. the Tunkl public policy exception test). Thus, any 
element of a test that tends to apply to all or almost all situations, is logically the least 
compelling element. 
14 
Rothstein next asserts that Tunkl's fourth and fifth elements are met because "all local 
ski areas apparently impose a similar liability provision as a condition for skiing". (R. at 216). 
Tunkl's fourth and fifth elements examine whether: 
(4) As a result of the essential nature of the service in the economic setting 
of the transaction, the party invoking exculpation possesses a decisive 
advantage of bargaining strength against any member of the public who 
seeks [the party's] services and (5) [i]n exercising a superior bargaining 
power, the party confronts the public with a standardized adhesion contract of 
exculpation, and makes no provision whereby a purchaser may pay additional 
reasonable fees and obtain protection against negligence. TunkL 383 P.2d at 
446. 
First, Rothstein's allegation assumes the nature of the service (use of a mountain for 
recreational skiing) to be "essential" - an assumption that is contrary to every opinion 
addressing this issue. Second, Rothstein's supporting allegation for these elements is untrue. 
Snowbird and Utah's other ski areas offer lift tickets and ski passes that allow skiing without 
signing a Release. (R. at 351, 356-362). Indeed, Rothstein could have purchased a 2002-2003 
Snowbird day lift ticket to access the very same terrain without ever signing an exculpatory 
agreement as a pre-condition. (R. at 351, 356-362). See Chauvlier. 35 P.3d at 388 ("Chauvlier 
did not have to sign a release in order to buy a one-day ski pass. Although a day pass was 
more expensive than the Spring Pass he bought, Chauvlier does not contest the fact that he 
did have the option of skiing at Booth Creek without signing a release. Therefore, the 
exculpatory clause here cannot be a ctake it or leave it' adhesion contract"). (Italics in 
original). 
Furthermore, Rothstein's argument concerning other local Resorts using similar 
Releases has been tried before and rejected in an analogous context See Bauer v. Aspen 
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Highlands Skiing Corporation. 788 F. Supp. 472, 474-475 (D. Colo. 1992) ("defendant's 
recreational services were not essential and, therefore, they did not enjoy an unfair bargaining 
advantage. Nor does it matter that all ski rental shops in Aspen required the same 
release. Plaintiff could have satisfied her business interest by absorbing the ambiance of 
Aspen without skiing. Therefore, I conclude that the exculpatory agreement was fairly 
entered into and is not an adhesion contract"), (emphasis added). In any event, Rothstein 
could have skied at Park City Mountain Resort or The Canyons Resort during the 2002-2003 
ski season without ever signing a Release Agreement. (R. at 351, 356-362). This is especially 
significant since Rothstein lived in Park City during the 2002-2003 season and, thus, had 
almost immediate access to world-class Resorts without having to sign any Release 
Agreements. (R. at 344, 351, 356-362).6 
Finally, Rothstein asserts that he was subject to defendant's control (TunkJ's sixth 
element) with respect to the purported "snow covered retaining wall". Whether this is true 
or not is of little consequence given the fact Rothstein's other arguments regarding the Tunkl 
elements are strained. However, Rothstein, in any event, was not under defendant's control -
Rothstein was not forced or corralled into the subject area and could have easily descended 
6
 Rothstein notes, in passing, that in Rosen v. LTV Recreational Dev.. Inc.. 569 F.2d 
1117, 1123 (10th Cir. 1978), the Tenth Circuit found a Release Agreement exculpating a 
Colorado ski area to be an unenforceable adhesion contract. Rothstein fails to note, 
however, that since the Rosen decision, other Tenth Circuit and Federal District of Colorado 
decisions have made clear that recreational provider Releases, including those in favor of ski 
areas, are enforceable and not adhesive. See infra at p. 15., Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing 
Corporation. 788 F. Supp. 472, 474-475 (D. Colo. 1992) (no adhesion contract because 
skiing is not an essential activity) and Mincin v. Vail Holdings. Inc.. 308 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th 
Cir. 2002) ("(TJhere is no such 'practical necessity' as mountain biking is not an essential 
activity. Thus, Mincin did not enter into the contract from an inferior bargaining position"). 
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the mountain on other ski trails/runs. (R. at 345-348). He instead voluntarily chose to ski 
where he did - an area that undisputedly had an erected rope-line immediately above it with 
orange streamers for skier awareness. (R. at 207-208). 
Accordingly, Rothstein not only demands a result rejected by the great majority of 
jurisdictions, he does so by incorrectly applying the Tunkl elements and contradicting the very cases 
upon which he relies. 
IV. THE FOUR "PUBLIC POLICY" CASES RELIED UPON BY 
ROTHSTEIN ARE MINORITY HOLDINGS THAT ARE CLEARLY 
DISTINGUISHABLE IN ANY EVENT. 
A. Dalury v. S-K-ILtd. and Hanks v. Powder Ridge. 
Rothstein's reliance on Dalury v. S-K-I Ltd., 670 A.2d 795 (Vt. 1995), a disfavored and 
repeatedly rejected decision, is insufficient to overcome the great majority of jurisdictions finding 
pre-injury exculpatory agreements enforceable. See e.g. Street 75 F. Supp.2d at 1299-1300 ("Dalury 
did indeed conclude, based on principles underlying business invitee law, that ski resorts affect the 
public interest to such a degree as to warrant imposition of a public duty on ski resort operations. 
However, Dalury finds little company in that conclusion"), (emphasis added); Seigneur, 752 
A.2d at 641 ("[T]he holding in Dalury is against the great weight of authority"); and 
Chauvlier, 35 P.3d at 388-389 (specifically rejecting Dalury and enforcing pre-injury exculpatory 
agreement in recreational skiing context). 
Dalury's focus on a perceived'loss of incentive for ski areas to act with reasonable care and a 
purported disparity in bargaining power ignores that which the great majority of other jurisdictions 
recognize: (1) unlike activities that traditionally implicate issues of great public importance such as 
hospital care, public transportation, and utilities, skiing is a purely voluntary non-essential activity 
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of no great public import and (2) many recreational activities may cease to exist or become cost 
prohibitive if exculpatory agreements are invalidated. See e.g. Clanton v. United Skates of America. 
686 N.E.2d 896, 900 (End. Ct App. 1997) ("To hold that this release is per se unenforceable on the 
basis that it limits an individual's recovery for his injuries, as Clanton urges us to do, would 
invalidate all exculpatory releases connected with a recreational activity. Such a result would 
dramatically raise the cost of participation in these activities and severely limit the public's 
recreational opportunities") (emphasis added); Donegan. 894 F.2d at 207 (In enforcing a pre-
injury Release, "[t]he court emphasized that. . . the races could not continue without such 
protection from liability"); Walton. 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *12 ("Here, public policy supports, 
rather than detracts from, the application of the exculpatory clause. 'Unless courts are willing to 
dismiss such actions without trial, many popular and lawful recreational activities are 
destined for extinction'") (emphasis added); and McCune. 612 S.E.2d at 466 ("If these 
agreements, voluntarily entered into, were not upheld, the effect would be to increase the liability 
of those organizing or sponsoring such events to such an extent that no one would be willing to 
undertake to sponsor a sporting event"). 
Unlike Dalury, these "public policy" cases that focus on the recreational provider's financial 
health are consistent with the express "public policy" underlying Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act 
- i.e. protecting Utah ski areas' economic viability by clarifying the law to encourage more willing 
liability insurers at lower, more cost effective rates. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51. Thus, not 
only is Dalury a disfavored, minority decision, it is the least compatible with the express "public 
policy" underlying Utah's Inherent Risk Act 
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Hanks v. Powder Ridge. 888 A.2d 734, 747 (Conn. 2005), despite acknowledging that 
"most states uphold [purported] adhesion contracts releasing recreational operators from 
prospective liability for personal injuries caused by their own negligent conduct", suffers from the 
same public policy shortcomings as Dalury. (emphasis added). Additionally, other aspects of the 
Hanks holding are specifically distinguishable from Utah law and the facts underlying Rothstein's 
appeal. 
In Hanks, the Connecticut court held that a significant disparity in bargaining power existed 
because "the plaintiff, who traveled to Powder Ridge in anticipation of snowtubing that day, was 
faced with the dilemma of either signing the defendants' proffered waiver of prospective liability or 
foregoing completely the opportunity to snowtube at Powder Ridge". Id. at 746. Even if a 
significant disparity in bargaining power exists in such instances (although most jurisdictions 
conclude it does noi)y Rothstein's circumstances were, nevertheless, far different. Rothstein did not 
travel far distances for one day of skiing only to be confronted with the option of signing a Release 
or going back home without skiing. Rather, Rothstein purchased not only a Seasons Pass, but a 
Seven Summits Club membership well in advance of the 2002-2003 ski season and the subject 
incident. (R. at 2-3, 185, 189-191). He had plenty of time to contemplate whether or not he 
wanted to sign the corresponding Release Agreements. (R. at 2-3, 185, 189-191). Indeed, it is 
undisputed that Rothstein had other skiing options at Snowbird and elsewhere that he voluntarily 
chose to forego - he could have skied at Snowbird on a day pass or he could have purchased a 
Seasons Pass at Park City Mountain Resort in Park City, Utah (where Rothstein resides) without 
signing any Release. (R. at 351, 356-362). 
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Finally, the Hanks Court also noted that because Connecticut does not recognize degrees of 
negligence, enforcing exculpatory agreements would limit ski area liability to situations involving 
conduct more extreme than gross negligence: 
[W]e find it significant that many states uphold exculpatory agreements in the 
context of simple negligence, but refuse to enforce such agreements in the context of 
gross negligence. Connecticut does not recognize degrees of negligence and, 
consequently, does not recognize the tort of gross negligence as a separate basis of 
liability. Accordingly, although in some states recreational operators cannot, 
consistent with public policy, release themselves from prospective liability for 
conduct that is more egregious than simple negligence, in this state, were we to 
adopt the position advocated by the defendants, recreational operators would 
be able to release their liability for such conduct unless it rose to the level of 
recklessness. As a result, recreational operators would lack the incentive to exercise 
even slight care". 
Id. at 747-48. (Italics in original). (Emphasis added). 
Utah, however, recognizes gross negligence as a separate basis of liability and, thus, the same 
concerns expressed in Hanks have no applicability here. See Moon Lake Elec. Assn. v. 
Ultrasystems Wstrn Const Inc.. 767 P.2d 125 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, Dalury and Hanks 
provide no basis for reversing Judge Quinn's correct Ruling dismissing Rothstein's ordinary 
negligence claim. 
B. Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corporation and Phillips v. Monarch are 
Likewise Distinguishable and of N o Consequence. 
The decisions in Berlangieri v. Running Elk Corporation. 76 P.3d 1098 (N.M. 2003), and 
Phillips v. Monarch. 668 P.2d 982 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983), rely on the interpretation of statutes 
clearly distinguishable from Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, and are, thus, not persuasive here. 
In Berlangieri. the New Mexico Supreme Court invalidated a pre-injury Release Agreement by 
focusing specifically on how the New Mexico Legislature publicly regulated equine activities. Id. at 
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1 1
 i 'niike Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, the New Mexico Equine Liability Act's language 
iini'l a instruction i'V-;/vr,ii/"]/1 \du*)i \ ;i litjny < >l jtts and '<n* < >t illusion's' from its cove! i^c. Jjl H I I Mt-
i ! ndeed, the Berlangieri Court noted that "[w]e quoted the statute in its entirety to show that, 
by far, the bulk of the statute explains what type of activities equine operators may be held 
liable1 linn, mil KIIP Hir^ Im v luiii li lliry MI I^  niniil III 11»iIIIii\ M. .till I I I I (emphasis .aided). 
The Berlangieri Coutt continued by stating "Subsection C [of the Act] goes into considerable detail 
in this regard, while "equine behavior' is only briefly discussed. This suggests that the 
Legislature afminptrtl lo pmvi " -c t iu , i M-uiecuu:, ' p;iiruns of ei|iiifM" iiil'i villi's ill llllii1 
Act than they otherwise would have enjoyed". !J (emphasis added). 
Similarly, in Phillips v. Monarch, «><• s jv \; i '' s c^ express statutory duties enumerated in 
Colorado's Ski Safety Act of 19 7° . • . • - . ; : : . . * - k lat ing the pre i nji lry E = lease 
Colorado's Ski Safety Act enumerates many express ski area operator duties of care, including a 
statutory provision speaking diru;;i\ .. ;ne purported incd..miMJi . injurv in Phillips ami .in 
additional statutory provision stating thai VfcvioL*ti*•*» : .-JI.-M >. r- -.• "•. ; 
injury to any person constitutes negligence". Id. at 985-986 and (.". *< .S. [\ i 3 44-1 * M These express 
sta t utory dl;i ities of: ca re are completely non-existen i>: • V;J . :u- .u K\>& wr .i.£ i-t : ; . .;,-
Ann. §§ 78-27-51-54. 
21. 
In addition, Rothstein fails to cite Chadwick v. Colt Ross Outfitters. Inc.. 100 P.3d 465 
(Colo. 2004), a case from the same jurisdiction as Phillips, that enforced a pre-injury Release 
addressing statutory language much more akin to Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act. In upholding 
the pre-injury Release in Chadwick. the Colorado Supreme Court found the following significant: 
Apart from imposing a general requirement to give notice of the inherent 
risks to be assumed by a participant, see § 13-21-119(5)(a) - - (b), the 
legislature has, however, done nothing to regulate equine activities or to 
impose additional duties on equine activity sponsors. Rather, the statute 
recognizes the inherent risks involved in equine activities and protects 
sponsors of equine activities by limiting their liability, except under specified 
circumstances. See § 13-21-119(4) (b). The statute itself imposes no liability 
on the sponsors for injuries beyond those for which liability is specifically 
limited, and this court has made clear that parties may, consistent with the statute, 
contract separately to release sponsors even from negligent conduct, as long as the 
intent is clearly expressed in the contract. 
Chadwick 100 R3d at 468. (Emphasis added). 
The same statutory analysis in Chadwick that resulted in enforcement of a pre-injury 
Release could just as easily be applied to Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act. As in Chadwick 
Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act (1) imposes no additional duties on ski area operators other than 
the nominal duty to give notice of the inherent risks, (2) imposes no liability for injuries beyond 
those for which liability is specifically limited, and (3) specifically endeavors to protect ski area 
operators by limiting their liability. Utah's Inherent Risk Act, unlike the New Mexico Equine 
Liability Act in Berlangieri or the Colorado Skier Safety Act in Phillips, does not attempt to provide 
"greater protection for [ski area] patrons.. . than they otherwise would have enjoyed". Berlangieri 
75 P.3d at 1111. Rather, Utah's Inherent Risk Act expressly seeks to protect ski areas from sharply 
rising insurance premiums and limited insurance coverage options by immunizing ski areas from 
liability for injuries resulting from a non-exclusive list of inherent risks. Thus, Berlangieri and 
Phillips are unpersuasive, distinguishable cases that should not be followed here. 
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V rOLLOWING
 R O T H S T E I N > s p u B L I C P O L I C Y CASES WOULD 
INVADE T H E UTAH LEGISLATURE'S PROVINCE BY IGNORING 
WHAT T H E LEGISLATURE DOES WHEN IT INTENDS O N 
PROHIBITING EXCULPATORY AGREEMENTS. 
-. * • i lowing Rothstein's "public policy" cases would require this Court to first imply statutory 
di iti - * • Ut Inluruit Ki'-'» i>!; Skiing \\ I JIUI, ln>m 'hut, n1" IImlactoe an imagined 
legislative intent to invalidate ^//pre-injury Releases connected with ski area operations. This asks 
too much. See Berube v. Fashion Centre. 771 P.2d 1033,1°H (\T\ di 1989) quoting from Patton v. 
United States. " . • du*nry < •' • •>• • n \ embodies a doctrine of 
vague ,tnd variable quality and unless deducible in the given circumstances from constitutional or 
statutory provisions, should be accepted as a basis for judicial determination, if at all, only with 
the utmost circumspec • •: ;;ii i- .. • * ,i . Kuheiiwtii v. vl'&n . s * <, <
 : < 
(Utah 1992) ("Before we can interfere with the enforcement of [a] private agreement, we 
must lind the private agreement offends the. public policy embodied in the statute, offends it so 
severely that it requires striking the term or < hnse ,is unnih >u e.ib'e h ('emphasis added); Seigneur 
v. National Fitness Inst. Inc.. 752 A.2d 631, 6 II (Md. Spec <_'u App 2000) ("public policy . . . is a 
Any uiuiily horse and when once you get astride it you never know where u %uli enrrryou. Tt mav 
lead you from the sound law. It is never argued at all but when other ;; > 
added), (internal citations omitted); Finch v. Andrews, et aL 863 P.2d 4%, 4{) \ in. 1 ()re. Ct App. 
199 '* ;• :. . • •• helme in oni I will mkiu re . :i- i e parties"'" 
freedom to contract"), (emphasis added). 
The more logical less attenuated approach dictates examining what Utah's legislature does 
•when it truly \\\\v\'^ • • \ l -1 e • \ . y •.•,o agreements I h is is i r: lportai-r • * ai: - e i.-^^.auve ' 
intent normally dictates public policy, especially in areas already addressed by statute. See e.g. 
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Chauvlier v. Booth Creek Ski Holdings. Inc.. 35 P.3d 383, 388, fn. 28 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) ("We 
note that since the Washington State Legislature has chosen to regulate recreational skiing 
by statute, it is for the Legislature, and not the courts, to declare that Liability releases in 
the recreational skiing context violate public policy"), (emphasis added). 
Several Utah statutes make clear that when the legislature's intent is to prohibit exculpatory 
or other agreements on public policy grounds, the statute's express language will so state. For 
instance, with respect to the construction industry, Utah's legislature in Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 
provides: 
A covenant, promise, agreement or understanding in, or in connection with or 
collateral to, a contract or agreement relative to the construction, alteration, repair or 
maintenance of a building.. . purporting to indemnify the promisee against liability 
for damages arising out of bodily injury to persons or damage to property caused by 
or resulting from the sole negligence of the promisee, his agents or employees, or 
indemnitee, is against public policy and is void and unenforceable, (emphasis 
added). 
See Seigneur. 752 A.2d at 637 (finding that public policy will only invalidate exculpatory agreements 
where the legislature expressly states so by statute - citing a Maryland statute almost identical 
to Utah Code Ann. § 13-8-1 above as an example of express statutory language), (emphasis 
added). Similarly, with respect to Utah's Product Liability Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-7, 
Indemnification provisions void and unenforceable^ provides: 
Any clause in a sales contract or collateral document that requires a purchaser or end 
user of a product to indemnify, hold harmless, or defend a manufacturer of a 
product shall be contrary to public policy and is void and unenforceable if a 
defect in the design or manufacturing of the product causes an injury or death. 
(Emphasis added). See also Utah Code Ann. § 34-34-4 ("Any express or implied agreement between 
any employer and any labor union [where an individual] shall be denied the right to work for an 
employer . . . is hereby declared to be . . . against public policy"), (emphasis added). 
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The Federal District Court for Utah, applying Utah law, in Zollman v. High Country 
» .iovvniot,iic i VMii^  n A '' * •* ' f , (. >gnj/-^: ;:•/ Jt,_:native practice 
when it found a pre-injury exculpatory agreement involving a snowmobile recreational provider not 
against public policy. In Zollman. the plaintiff "suffered numerous injuries, including facial injuries 
\vhi< li die jllegc[d| j\vcir| pcrmimcnfly <lisi"i(i.*iiru 1^ "* ai'icr drlcndniifs "guide"1 dint ird lici \\\ 
proceed over a "(.n--r'\ wherein she collided with another snowmobiler. Id. at 924. As a condition 
of using defendant's snowmobiles and land, defendant required its customers to sign a release 
agreen lent, wh ich plaintiff d id. Pla intiff a rgi led, however, that the E elease \ iolated the pi :ibJ ic 
policy incorporated in Utah's Off-Highway Vehicle Act, Utah Code Ann. § 41-22-1 to 33. The 
Federal District G :)i:ift for [ Jtah rejected plaintiffs "public policy" argument despite express 
statutory language stating: 
[I] t is the policy of this state to promote safety and protection for persons, 
property and the environment connected with the use, operation and 
equipment of off-highway vehicles. 
Id. at 926, fh.7. (emphasis added;, in don-/ iK * - -.^ ••
 f •• •' - i - - i d v ; 
Act's absence of language prohibiting parties from c< >Mracting to "limit their liability" aid i m the 
I -imitation of I andow ner I iabi 1 It y : \ ct s sirn ilar silence. Id. at 92 7. 
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The Zollman Court stated: 
The Act deals little with instruction in snowmobile training and in no place suggested 
that parties providing such training cannot seek to limit their liability. The court will 
not strain to find such a reading of the release agreement. Second, elsewhere in the Utah 
Code, the legislature has expressly limited the liability of landowners who, without charging 
admission, make their land available to others for recreational purposes. See Utah [C]ode 
Ann. § 57-14-1 to -7 (1988). This provision does not limit liability for those who charge 
admission to others for the recreational use of property under their control. Id. at § 57-14-
6. Nevertheless, the legislature did not preclude such landowners from seeking to 
limit liability. Based on the foregoing provisions of Utah law, the court concludes 
that it is not public policy of the state of Utah to prohibit a business such as High 
Country from seeking to limit its liability. Id. (Emphasis added).7 
See also Sorenson's Ranch School et al. v. Dept. of Human Services, et aL 36 P.3d 528, 532 (Utah 
2001) (Department's public policy argument that the Legislature, through U.C.A. § 62A-4a-401, 
implicitly intended to ban all felons from working at any child service facility failed where two other 
Utah statutes "specifically and expressly" banned felons from other types of employment - "Had 
the Legislature wished to eliminate all convicted felons from working at a licensed youth program it 
could have done so explicitly as it did in the above cited sections"), (emphasis added). 
Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act in no way prohibits ski areas from using exculpatory 
agreements. Had Utah's legislature intended on prohibiting such agreements, it would have done 
so expressly as it has in other contexts. Finally, where, as here, Utah's Inherent Risk Act represents 
a direct affirmative attempt to protect Utah's ski industry (i.e. by encouraging more willing 
insurance providers at more cost-effective rates), pre-injury Releases do not at all, let alone 
"severely" offend that public policy. Thus, this Court should affirm the dismissal of Rothstein's 
ordinary negligence claim. 
7
 Although the Zollman Court found no public policy violation, it found the 
Release's language to be unclear and, thus, unenforceable based on verbal instructions 
purportedly given to Zollman by the defendant's employee. Zollman, 797 F. Supp. at 926, 928. 
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i I ROTHSTEIN'S OUT-OF-CONTEXT CITATION TO LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY DOES NOT INVALID ATK THE RELEASES HE SIGNED 
VOLUNTARILY AS AN ADULT. 
Rothstein's selective citation to iln irN n nt Risk of Skiing Act's legislative history should 
fi: :)t I: € considered .mu, in any event, misleads . h^ * .ourt with respect to the legislative intent 
concerning exculpatory agreements. 
Nothing in the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act Suggests that Utah's Legislature 
Intended to Invalidate Exculpatory Agreements and, Thus, Under Utah Law, 
It Is Improper to Consider Legislative History. 
It is well-established that the legislature's intent '"'is iiuinilesu d by the langim;.',* il employ^l1 ' 
and that courts can look to secondary principles of statutory construction or legislative history 
i lily it we lind tin- |hLitiitui'y| prn\ isiuii ambiguous". Smith, et a i v. Price Development 
Company. 125 P.3d 945, 949-50 (Utah 2005). (emphasis added), I.. Smith. • • » ^ . ^ e- •* 
Court reviewed Utah's Split Recovery provision, Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1 *J>), com erning punitive 
Jiinu^e awards. This ( ,< mrl eonsklefeii whether under the Split Recovery provision in N.ii. ^ f 
- Utah held an interest in the "punitive damages" judgment entered in favor or . t !nn:i • 
portion ofthe proceeds once paid. Th is Court held that the statuto.ry provision's language made clear 
secondary evidence advanced by the State". Id. 950-51. In doing so, this Court relied on what the 
s:a:un -A rot say as much, as what the statute did say: 
It is significant that the provision contains no l anguage m a k i n g the State a 
party to the Smiths' action or a judgment creditor in the Smiths' punitive 
damages award . . . The State essentially asks us to redraft the provision, 
inserting language that the legislature did not and removing language that 
the legislature selected. 
Id. at 950. (emphasis added). 
27 
The fact Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act "contains no language" barring exculpatory 
agreements is especially "significant" here because, as mentioned in Section V above, when Utah's 
legislature seeks to bar exculpatory or other agreements, it states so expressly.. Instead, the Inherent 
Risk Act's express "Public Policy" provision makes abundantly clear its underlying motivation - i.e. 
to protect Utah's ski industry by encouraging lower premiums and more willing insurers through 
clarification of the existing common law. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-51 states: 
Public Policy. The Legislature finds that the sport of skiing is practiced by a large 
number of residents of Utah and attracts a large number of nonresidents, 
significandy contributing to the economy of this state. It further finds that few 
insurance carriers are willing to provide liability insurance protection to ski 
area operators and that the premiums charged by those carriers have risen 
sharply in recent years due to confusion as to whether a skier assumes the 
risks inherent in the sport of skiing. It is the purpose of this act, therefore, to 
clarify the law in relation to skiing injuries and the risks inherent in that sport, and to 
provide that, as a matter of public policy, no person engaged in. that sport shall 
recover from a ski operator for injuries resulting from those inherent risks, 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, similar to Smith, the Inherent Risk Act's legislative intent permitting exculpatory 
agreements is clear because of what it says and does not say. As such, consideration of legislative 
history is improper here. 
B. Even If Legislative History is Considered, Ski Area Exculpatory Agreements 
Do Not Violate the Inherent Risk Act's Public Policy. 
Given Utah courts' refusal to interfere with private agreements unless a statute's public 
policy is "severely offended", Rothstein's reliance on the legislature's incidental, passive retention of 
an already-existing common law duty to act in a "non-negligent manner" is insufficient to invalidate 
ski area exculpatory agreements. Retherford v. AT&T. 844 P.2d 949, 967, fh.ll (Utah 1992) 
('"Before we can interfere with the enforcement of [a] private agreement, we must find the private 
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agreement offends the public policy embodied in the statute, offends it so severely that it 
requires striking the term or clause as unenforceable3') (en iplvasis nlded). 
Instead, where, as here, the legislative history evidences an intent to protect the recreational 
| • r« >v idct ,iii i lus i use, ski area operator.) : * limiting their liability exposure, exculpatory agreements 
are actually consistent with the Inherent Risk Act's public polirv :r; h> •> ;•*] rvU • c • ! • •* .{ . 
Marc Street v. Darwin Ranch. Inc., 75 V. Supp.2d 1296, 1 ^M» (1). Vv<>. V)K)% the plaintiff signed a 
Ki k*.;^  A^iLi-n:-
 t .:• t • • ,, . i>c!)uciv nc.v, \\r.;-. iu. iaicr :ned to avoid . . . ; , r .i^ 
guise of public policy The Court rejected plaintiffs public policy contention, instead finding "u 
pre-injury Release to be consistent with the Wyoming Recreational Safety Act's goal of immunizing 
in reafiotuil providers from lubiltl\ JSS<K utol ufh iniiriviil usks. I lie Inderal liisiml ijmrt for 
Wyoming stated: 
T]he true public policy expressed by the Act is to benefit the recreation 
industry and Wyoming economy by eliminating provider liability for inherent 
recreation activity risks. The Release is, at the very least, consistent with the 
public policy expressed by the Act, if not in furtherance of it. Plaintiffs 
position that the Release violates a policy expressed by the Act is, to be frank, 
bewildering. 
-i .1 1300 1 301 (Emphj isis adde< 1) (Ini c .i :nal citations omitted) 
Similarly, in Henderson v. Quest Expeditions, Inc.. 174 S.W.3d 730, 733 (Tenn. L/L '• • : . 
..!()< If)), the Tennessee Court of Appeals recently found a pre-injury Release barring negligence 
claims to be con-i - - ] .•'* j. N i . t v . . •- '• -
commercial white water rafting operations . . . by discouraging claims based on injury, 
cicM'tii in damages resulting from risks inherent in white water rafting", (emphasis added). 
iVn/ffl.Clanton v. I nited Skates <a' America. 0K6 N.K '.M H(Jii„ ''Ml i liml i'\. \pp. 1"'' MI d\\% i 
that our legislature has clearly expressed its desire to encourage recreational activities by 
limiting the liability of landowners who open their property for recreational use by the public 
and [plaintiffs] failure to cite any legislation which specifically prohibits such a release, we cannot 
conclude that this exculpatory release violates public policy"), (emphasis added). Chadwick v. Colt 
Ross Outfitters. 100 P.3d at 468 (Pre-injury Release consistent with Colorado equine activities 
statute and, thus, enforceable because the statute seeks to "protect sponsors of equine activities by 
limiting their liability"). 
Here, former Utah Senator Fred Finlinson, the original sponsor of the Inherent Risk Bill, 
made clear the underlying legislative intent to protect Utah's ski area operators. Senator Finlinson 
stated that the increase in lawsuits against ski areas "has created potential problems for our ski 
areas. So, as a result, many of the ski area states, that have ski resorts, have moved in a position 
of modifying and clarifying in their law that the ski area is not responsible for injuries that come 
from the inherent risks of skiing". (Senate Floor Debate Audio Recording, Feb. 17, 1979, Disk 
184), attached as Exhibit T3' to Addendum. The Senator further added that: 
We are just clarifying the law to make sure that the law says that the skier is 
responsible for getting down the mountain under his own power. That was the basic 
thrust of what this Bill does. As we make that change that will have a, hopefully a 
good impact on the kinds of costs that are incurred in the liability insurance that they 
have to go out and buy in order to make sure that they can operate their resort. 
(Senate Floor Debate Audio Recording, Feb. 19,1979, Disk 187). 
Indeed, Senator Finlinson, by sworn Affidavit, makes clear that it is a "complete fabrication" to assert 
that exculpatory agreements offend the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act's public policy or that the Act 
intended on barring exculpatory agreements. (See Finlinson Affidavit, attached as Exhibit "B" to 
Addendum). 
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Because the "secondary evidence" clearly shows an over-riding intent to protect Utah's ski 
offended by enforcing exculpatory agreements, let alone "severely offended". Thus, whether 
legislative history is considered »-i ii* >K ilu i \
 ;. .\ -h ,s the same ski area exculpatory agreements 
a re enforceable. 
CONCLUSION 
. ix ;wo N. .i-asc of I .lability Agreements signed voluntarily by Rothstein, a 50 year old long-
time recreations I skier, are clear arid uneqi il v oca 1, do n :»t v iolate pi ib] ic policy, arid she i ilel be 
enforced. Accordingly, Snowbird respectfully requests this Court to affirm Judge Quinn's Ruling, 
dismissing Rothstein's ordinary negligence claims MJ^prejiiuke. 
DATED this of August, 2006. 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
Kevin J. Simon 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee Snowbird 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of August, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing APPELLEE'S BRIEF was served by hand-delivery on the following: 
Jesse Trentadue, Esq. 
Suitter Axland 
8 East Broadway, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM 
Exhibit A - Release of Liability Agreements and related deposition testimony of Rothstein 
(R. at 185-191, 343, 344). 
Exhibit B - Sworn Affida\ it of Fre< 1 W, I ?in 1 in SOJ i 
EXHIBIT 'A' 
RELEASE & INDEMNITY AGREEMENT 
("Agreement") 
THIS IS A BINDING LEGAL CONTRACT. 
PLEASE READ CAREFULLY BEFORE SIGNING. 
/ am aware (hat skiing, in its various forms ("skiing") is a hazardous 
irt involving the risk of injuries and death. In consideration for my use 
he Ma or Snowbird ski areas, I hereby waive all of my claims, 
uding clairns for personal injury, death and property damage, against Ma 
Snowbird, their agents and employees. I agree to assume all risks of 
sonal injury, death and/or property damage associated with skiing, snow-
irding and/or jumping or resulting from the fault of Ma or Snowbird, their 
nts and employees. I agree to hold harmless and indemnify 
' and Snowbird, Their agents and employees from all.ofmy claims, includ-
those caused bv the negligence or other fault of Ma or Snowbird, their 
nts and employees. I agree that any litigation that I or my representa-
s initiate against Ma or Snowbird, their agents and employees shall be 
jght exclusively in Salt Lake County, Utah, and that the laws of the State 
Hah shall govern. 
snowbird 
Pasi.ff . .. 
Dale Pass Type 
Cashier — - Depl -
snowbird IMPORTANT; 
^ ^ 1 ^ f f * Please read both sides of this 
^m ^r card carefully and sign your " ^ 
^ ' name in the spaces provided. 
Please print clearly 
Name V V . W ^ W A P\ • l ^ ^ - f e ^ 
Dale ol Birth-
C l l y . . l ^ t ^ W _ s,a,eStCT21p..<g.l4C 6^ 
Country „ _ ™ 
Telephone H & J l J & S ' : 3 * J 7 7 - — 
" =C 
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1 Q. At t h e t i m e you p u r c h a s e d t h e Seven 
2 Summit p a s s i n Ann B o r g i o n e ' s o f f i c e w i t h O r i , d i d 
3 you s i g n a r e l e a s e ? 
4 A . Y e s . 
5 Q. And did you read the release? 
6 A. Yes. 
7 Q. Did you understand the release? 
8 A. I believe so. 
9 Q. Okay. Did you ask Ann Borgione any 
10 questions about the language of the release? 
11 A. I don't believe so. 
12 Q. Had you signed any similar releases 
13 before you purchased the Seven Summits pass for 
14 the 2002-2003 ski season from Ann Borgione? 
15 A, I'm sorry. I don't understand the 
16 question. 
17 I Q. Let me ask it again, then* Had yo,u 
18 signed any other release prior to the releasee yoi 
19 | signed when you purchased the Seven Summit pass 
20 from Ann Borgione? 
21 I A* I think what you mean is every time I 
22 bought a season's pass at a ski resort I've 
23 signed a similar release. 
24 I Q. Okay. And which other resorts have you 
25 purchased a season pass at beside the Seven 
m Thacker + CoLLc, Court Reporters 
Utah's Ltcdtr in Lxktgabo* Sitftort 
Corporate Offices: 50 West Broadway, Suite 900, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
g 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Summits one for 2002-2003 at Snowbird? 
A. Park City, Deer Valley, and The 
Canyons. 
Q. And which years did you buy season 
passes when you signed releases at those three 
resorts? 
A. During my tenure in Park City, which is 
15 years, I've purchased at all three--four of 
these resorts, Snowbird, Canyons, Park City, and 
Deer Valley. 
Q. Each of the 15 years you've lived here. 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. Okay. Then tell--
A. Each of the 15 years I've purchased a 
pass somewhere. 
Q. Okay. 
A. I believe at Snowbird I've at least 
purchased coupon books and Deer Valley coupon 
books and--I believe it's the same release whether 
you buy a coupon book or a full season's pass. 
Q. Okay. Have you ever refused to sign a 
r e l e a s e a t an y of the r e s o r t s t h a t you have 
1 b o u g h t season passes and coupon b o o k s ? 
A- No. 
Q. W h a t ' s your u n d e r s t a n d i n g of t h e e f f e c t 
! 1 
Im Thackei\-f Co LLC Court Reporters 
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1 BY MR. STRACHAN: 
2 Q. The court reporter, Mr. Rothstein, has 
3 marked what's Exhibit 1. Is that your signature 
4 at the bottom? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. And is that the release that you signed 
7 when you purchased the 2002-2003 Seven Summits 
8 season pass at Snowbird? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. Would you read it, please? 
11 A. "I am aware that skiing, in its various 
12 forms, is a hazardous sport involving the risk of 
13 injuries and death. In consideration for my use 
14 of the Alta or Snowbird ski areas, I hereby waive 
15 all my claims, including claims for personal 
16 injury, death, and property damage against Alta or 
17 Snowbird, their agents and employees. I agree to 
18 assume all [of the] risks of personal injury 
19 death, . . . or properly,* — "property damage 
20 associated with skiing, snowboarding, and/or 
21 jumping or resulting from the fault of Alta [or] 
22 Snowbird, their agents and employees. I agree to 
23 hold harmless and indemnify Snowbird and Alta, 
24 their agents and employees from all of my claims, 
25 I including those caused by negligence or other 
ti Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
Utah's Leader « Litigate* Sttfort 
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1 fault of Alta or Snowbird, their agents and 
2 employees. I agree that any litigation that I or 
3 my representatives initiate against Alta or 
4 Snowbird, their agents and employees shall be 
5 brought exclusively in Salt Lake County . . ., 
6 and the laws of the State,of Utah shall govern." 
7 Signed by me. 
8 Q. Thank you. Have you discussed that 
9 release marked Exhibit 1 with anyone other than 
10 your Counsel, Mr. Trentadue, and anyone else in 
11 his firm? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Approximately how many times had you 
14 skied in the 2002-2003 ski season prior to the 
15 February 3, 2003, incident? 
16 A. Fifty. 
17 Q. At Snowbird? 
18 A. I don't recall. 
19 Q. When you ski Snowbird, you ride the Gad 
20 Zoom l i f t . 
21 J A. No t v e r y o f t e n . 
22 Q. Bu t y o u ' v e r i d d e n i t . 
23 A. Y e s . 
24 Q. O k a y . And y o u ' v e r i d d e n t h e Gad 1 
25 I l i f t . 
m Thacker + Co LLC Court Reporters 
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IF for an annual membership in Seven Summits Club and I have enclosed my payment for o doing, I agree that if my membership is approved, I will abide by the following terms and 
agree that I have read, understood and will abide by the Skier's responsibility code (a copy is 
sed, in the trail map) and the membership policies of the Seven Summits Club. I further agree that 
using Sevtn Summits Club's facilities and those of Snowbird Ski and Summer Resort I will conduct 
fin a manner consistent with membership in an exclusive club. I also agree to treat Snowbird guests 
mployees with courtesy and respect 
agree the Seven Summits Priority Pass can be revoked for failure to adhere to the skier's 
nsibility code, for violation of Snowbird's rules, policies or procedures, for skiing in closed areas, for 
j in a reckless or out of control manner or in a manner that could cause injury or harm to others, for 
ing a non-designated user to use the Seven Summits Priority Pass or any other benefits reserved solely 
even Summits Club members. Should the Seven Summits- Priority Pass be revoked, I agree that I will 
ve no refund, in full or part, of my membership fee. 
[ understand that this application will be subject to approval of Snowbird Ski and Summer Resort, 
sole and absolute discretion. 
I acknowledge that my membership constitutes a revocable license to use the locker room and lounge, 
ki mountain and any other facilities at Snowbird and does not confer upon me any ownership interest, 
ig rights, management input, or confer upon me any vested or prescriptive right or easement, in or to 
he locker room and lounge. I further acknowledge that all of the locker room and lounge is owned 
osively by Snowbird Ski and Summer Resort. 
If approved for a membership in Seven Summits Club, I agree that Snowbird Ski and Summer Resort 
have the right, in its sole discretion, to reserve memberships, to terminate or modify the membership 
:age, to increase or decrease the number of memberships offered, to discontinue operation of the locker 
n or lounge or both (any change in the locker room or lounge will not occur during the year for which I 
5 paid membership fees), to issue or terminate any membership, and to make any other changes in the 
is and conditions of the membership or the lounge and locker room available for use by members. 
I hereby acknowledge that the use of the locker room, lounge, ski mountain and any privilege 
or service incident to my membership in Seven Summits Club is undertaken with knowledge 
of the risk of possible injury. I am aware that skiing and snowboarding in their various 
forms (Skiing) are hazardous sports involving the risk of injuries and death. In 
consideration of my use of the Snowbird Corporation (Snowbird) ski area and facilities, I 
agree to assume and accept all risks of in fury to myself and mv guests* including the inherent 
risks of skiing, the risks associated with the operation of the ski area and risks caused bv the 
negligence of Snowbird* its employees, or agents. I release and agree to indemnify Snowbird, 
all landowners of the ski area, and their employees and agents from all claims for injury or 
damage arising out of the operation of the ski area or my activities at Snowbird, whether 
such injury or damage arises from the risks of skiing or from any other cause including the 
negligence of Snowbird, its employees and agents. I agree never to sue Snowbird, its 
employees or agents on any claim arising out of the operation of the ski area or my activities 
at Snowbird. This Agreements bitfdkfg on my heirs and assigns. 
plicant's Signature <^Y/laJI& Date // - >~JO - O^^^ 
is application shall not be binding upon Snowbird Ski and Summer Resort until the acceptance 
low is signed. 
PROVED AND ACCEPTED: 
towbird Ski and Summer Resort 
.ven Summits Club 
Date 
- K \ 
EXHIBIT <B' 
IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
WILLIAM ROTHSTEIN, an individual, : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT OF FRED 
: FINLINSON 
v. : 
SNOWBIRD CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, : 
: No. 20060158 SC 
Defendant. 
I, Fred W. Finlinson, after being duly sworn, hereby testify as follows: 
1. I am over twenty-one (21) years old and can competently testify as to and 
have personal knowledge of the matters described below. 
2. I am a former Utah Senator and the sponsor of the original Inherent Risk of 
Skiing Bill, that was enacted in 1979. I was also involved in the floor debates and committee 
meetings involving my Bill. 
3. I am thus qualified to testify as to the true intent underlying my Bill and the Inherent 
Risk of Skiing statute that directly resulted. 
4. The intent of and sole driving force behind Utah's Inherent Risk of Skiing Act was 
to help protect ski area operators by statutorily immunizing them from liability for risks inherent 
in the sport of skiing, snow-boarding and other related activities. That is abundantly clear from 
the "Public Policy" provision in the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act, U.C.A. § 78-27-51. 
5. Sharply rising insurance premiums, the limited availability of willing insurers, and 
the resulting economically injurious effect to Utah's ski areas was the impetus behind the Bill 
and the resulting Inherent Risk of Skiing Act. 
6. The lack of clarity in the common law made the insurance industry reluctant and, for 
the most part, unwilling to insure Utah's ski areas. We wanted to clarify the law specifically to 
reverse that trend so that ski area operators' insurance premiums would hopefully drop 
significantly and more insurers would be willing to write liability insurance policies for Utah's 
ski resorts. 
7. The Act was not intended to establish ski area operator duties of care or to protect 
skiers and we intentionally did not enumerate statutory ski area operator duties like some other 
states have done because we felt it would be detrimental to our goal of protecting Utah's ski area 
operators. 
8. During the legislative process associated with the passage of the Inherent Risk of Skiing 
Act, there was no discussion about prohibiting private contracts that release ski area operators 
from liability for their own negligence. 
9. Had Utah's Legislature intended on prohibiting Release Agreements in favor of ski 
area operators, we would have said so expressly as we have in other state statutes we have 
enacted. We did nothing of the sort with respect to the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act and to find 
that we did or that release agreements offend public policy would be a complete fabrication 
based on my sponsorship of the Inherent Risk of Skiing Act. 
DATED this J ^ H a y of August, 2006. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF UTAH) 
On August _j£^l? 2006, before me, LdfL^yp: A Fny., a Notary Public of the State of 
Utah, personally appeared /^km V* /vASS//itf&&ersonally known to me (or proved to me on the 
basis of satisfactory evidence) to be the person whose name is subscribed to the within 
instrument and acknowledged to me that he executed the same, and that by his signature on the 
instrument, the person executed the instrument. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this (S day of August, 2006. 
LORRIE A FOX 
NOTARY PUBLIC* STATE of UTAH 
8215 S1300W 
WEST JORDAN UT 14086 
MY QOMMlSSfON EXPIRES: OS-23-2008 
<# ^ y T 
Notary Public 
Residing in / / ^ y . 3Ls&-<^. our 
